



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 31, 1960

60-2284

100-2072

MEMORANDUM

FOR: The Honorable
Allen Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: John A. Calhoun
Director
Executive Secretariat

The following documents are enclosed for your personal information:

1. Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Chancellor Adenauer on Aerial Inspection Plan.
2. Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and Chancellor Adenauer on US-USSR Economic Strength; Aerial Inspection Zone; Self-Determination and Berlin Plebiscite.
3. Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and Chancellor Adenauer on Germany and Berlin.
4. Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and Foreign Minister von Brentano on Norstad Plan.
5. Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and Foreign Minister von Brentano on Chancellor Adenauer's Proposal for a Plebiscite in West Berlin; German Participation in Contingency Planning.

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State Dept. review completed

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SECRET Enclosures

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved: WH
3/22/60

Memorandum of Conversation

3696

DATE: March 15, 1960
1:00 p.m.
The White House

SUBJECT: Aerial Inspection Plan

PARTICIPANTS: President Eisenhower; Chancellor Adenauer
of Germany; (Mr. Charlick, LS, Interpreter)

COPIES TO:

S/S	Amembassy Bonn - Ambassador Dowling
G - Mr. Hare	Amembassy Moscow - Ambassador Thompson
C - Mr. Achilles	
S/B - Mr. Bohlen	The White House - General Goodpaster
EUR - Mr. Kohler	
S/AE - Mr. Farley	

Before the luncheon there was a brief exchange between the President and the Chancellor on the topic of the President's painting. The Chancellor also repeated a humorous remark about how highly a New York press photographer valued a picture of Mr. Adenauer and Mr. Ben-Gurion together.

During the luncheon, the President and the Chancellor exchanged impressions about the Vatican. The Chancellor asked what Mr. Eisenhower thought of the elaborate ceremonial there, and both agreed that there could be somewhat less of this. The Chancellor compared the personalities of the present Pope and his late predecessor. There followed some good-humored exchanges about the meaning of traditions and customs in general.

President Eisenhower then said that he had a serious topic to discuss. This was, to offer to the Soviets a plan for continuous aerial inspection, divorced from any disarmament aspects, and operating in selected regions. It would be in the nature of a try-out, to see if it would be workable during a given period. At the outset the President said that he did not necessarily always mean to involve Europe in such a program, that if the Soviets, for instance, would open some part of Siberia, he would be willing to offer all or part of Alaska. The Soviets would then be faced with the necessity of either accepting or refusing the plan.

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The Chancellor, after a moment's reflection, answered, "I would do it," and after a further pause, "It's a good idea," and "I do not believe 'they' will agree to it, but I would do it, nevertheless."

The President then went over the plan again, saying that "if we had one or two or three such areas, say, Siberia or Alaska or Central Europe," the aerial inspection could be tried out apart from any disarmament, to see if it would work. Nor would it be a valid objection that the plan would require excessive personnel. With modern infra-red techniques an aerial camera could locate the flower basket before them from a height of 50,000 feet.

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Approved in S: 3/24/60 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

3090

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 16, 1960
Secretary's Residence
After Dinner

SUBJECT: US-USSR Economic Strength; Aerial Inspection
Zone; Self-Determination and Berlin Plebiscite.

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany
Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe
Mr. Weber, Interpreter

~~COPIES TO:~~ Secretary Herter
Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon
Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant
Ambassador Walter C. Dowling

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Following dinner, during which the Chancellor was in a jovial frame of mind, the group listed above talked for over an hour in the library. Ambassadors Grewe and Dowling joined the group soon after the conversation began.

The first general subject discussed (launched by the Chancellor) was the economic position of the Soviet Union relative to the free world, and in particular to the United States. The Chancellor referred, as he had the evening before at the German Embassy, to the reports he had of great and growing Soviet strength. At one point he stated that he understood that by 1965 the economy of the Soviet Union would be equivalent to that of the United States. When this was quickly contested, he modified his statement to say that by 1965 the Soviet Union would have the capability of doing great damage at will in the disruption of the free economies of free nations and their export markets.

Mr. Dillon described the recent intention of the Soviet Union to ship 10,000 small cars into the U.S. market at a price roughly 25% below that at which they are sold within the Soviet Union. If the facts as stated were true, that would constitute dumping and would involve protective machinery. The Chancellor readily agreed that this was an illustration of what he had in mind.

Mr. Dillon

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Mr. Dillon then emphasized that recognition of the growth of Soviet economic strength was one of the major supports behind our policy of encouraging by all means available the common market of the Six and related liberal trading practices on the Continent, so that within the frame of the Atlantic Community the main industrial strength of the free world would operate most effectively and thereby minimize the future difficulties inherent in the growing economic power of the Soviet Union. The Chancellor agreed but added one or two comments which indicated the importance he attached to bilateral economic arrangements, presumably between the Federal Republic and the United States.

The Chancellor then turned the conversation to education, mentioning that he had had a discussion of this subject with Senator Fulbright. It was not entirely clear what points he was making, but he emphasized two. The first was that in the West our educational systems must give greater weight to the inculcation of moral principles to offset with the students the loss of authority of the family and the church. The second point which he did not expand was that something must be done to meet the growing problem of university graduates coming into a world which could not provide for all such graduates enough jobs suitable for their level of education.

The Secretary then changed the subject by saying that there was one matter which the President had discussed alone with the Chancellor the day before on which he wished to satisfy himself that there was a common understanding between us. He said that the Chancellor would recall that the President had spoken to him about the desirability of promptly and seriously examining, with a view to presentation to the Soviets, a proposal for an inspection zone in Europe which would include but not be confined to Germany, linked with the offer of an inspection zone covering Alaska and a part of eastern Siberia. The Secretary went on to emphasize that this would not be a disarmament measure but that it would serve the purpose of gaining experience with inspection methods and probing the extent of Soviet good faith.

The Chancellor reacted violently and said that in his conversation with the President there had been no mention whatsoever of an inspection zone in Europe. The only talk had been concerning one in Siberia and Alaska which he thought would be useful as a test of Soviet intentions and if accomplished might be valuable by reason of the great capability of modern cameras from the air.

The Secretary said that there must be some confusion and asked Mr. Merchant to report what the President had told him of his talk

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with the Chancellor immediately after the White House luncheon. The Chancellor continued to deny that in his recollection the President had ever mentioned Europe or a zone affecting Germany. He made clear that such a proposal was objectionable to him. The Secretary concluded this phase of the conversation by reiterating that a misunderstanding obviously existed and suggesting that the Four-Power Working Group might be charged with an examination of these ideas. The Chancellor neither agreed nor disagreed with this suggestion.

At this point the question of self-determination came up in the context of the Chancellor's Press Club proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin prior to the Summit. The Secretary said that we should consider this matter by looking further ahead to the wider application of self-determination. There was no doubt that a vote held in West Berlin on the maintenance of the present position would be a free vote and overwhelming in favor of the maintenance of existing arrangements. But we all know that an unsupervised vote in Communist-held territory would produce an impressive vote quite contrary to the true wishes of the inhabitants. This argued for inviting supervision, as for example by the United Nations, over any expression of popular will in western territories in order that the principle of such impartial supervision would apply to any plebiscite in Eastern Germany or in East Berlin.

The Chancellor reacted violently against this suggestion. Any election in West Berlin would, of course, be fair and free. The three Western Military Commandants could certify this. It would be derogatory of democracy if outside neutral supervision were asked. Moreover, there would be no time for arranging it before the Summit, and he visualized his proposal for a vote at Berlin as necessary before the Summit in order to confront Khrushchev with the evidence of how the West Berliners overwhelmingly felt. The argument continued but the Chancellor was adamant in his point of view. At one point, he said in effect that votes and plebiscites would never accomplish the freeing of the Soviet sector of Germany. This would come through what he described as political actions. The Chancellor also made some obscure reference to the acceptance of the original boundaries of Germany, but it was not exactly clear what he meant.

Throughout the discussion of the last two topics Dr. von Brentano frequently interrupted the Chancellor to argue with him, but with no apparent success. On several occasions, the exchanges were so rapid as to leave the interpreter far behind. Dr. Grewe was largely silent throughout, but it was perfectly apparent that the Chancellor's

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advisers would have modified substantially many of the Chancellor's statements, had they been able to do so.

The group broke up shortly after 11:30 and the Chancellor departed in a friendly mood. There seemed little doubt, however, that he was extremely disturbed by the inspection zone proposal and by the suggestion of any modification of his limited plebiscite proposal to be confined to West Berlin and conducted before the Summit meeting in May. What also seemed to emerge was the concentration of the Chancellor on maintaining the status quo in West Berlin and his relative lack of interest as of any practical concern in measures designed to keep the emphasis on the reunification of Germany in the impending negotiation.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 762.00/3-1560

APPROVED IN S
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Memorandum of Conversation

XR 346.1-PA 3143
 033.62011

DATE: March 15, 1960
 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

000007

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary

Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic
 Heinrich von Brentano, Foreign Minister of the German Federal Republic

Under Secretary Dillon
 Under Secretary Merchant
 Ambassador Dowling
 Counselor Achilles
 Assistant Secretary Kohler
 Assistant Secretary Berding
 Mr. Hillenbrand, GER
 Mr. Vigderman, GER
 Mr. McKiernan, GER/GPA
 Mr. Miller, GER
 Mrs. Lejins, LS

Ambassador Grewe
 Mr. Felix von Eckardt
 Dr. Karl Carstens
 Mr. Franz Krapf
 Dr. Franz-Josef Bach
 Mr. Peter Limbourg
 Mr. Karl-Guenther von Hase
 Mr. Heinz Weber
 Mr. Hermann Kusterer

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Foreign Minister von Brentano opened the discussion (before Chancellor Adenauer's arrival) by referring to the preparation of the Western position on Germany and Berlin for the Summit meeting. He said that clear alternatives -- or better, an agreed position -- could be prepared for consideration at the Western Foreign Ministers' meeting. The Western Powers might differ regarding certain nuances, but it was better to have a common position, even an unsatisfactory one, than to enter the Summit discussions in disagreement with one another. One of the questions on which an agreed position must be developed for presentation to the Soviets is: "What is the legal basis of the Western Powers' presence in Berlin?"

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Secretary

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Secretary Herter replied that we had prepared a number of papers covering varying alternative approaches to the Berlin problem but that we had taken no positions. The British had submitted no papers at all. The Germans had made their own position clear. The Secretary understood that they did not want to go beyond the Western proposals of July 28, 1959 and that they thought the existing situation was the best which could be achieved. He agreed that the Soviets should not be allowed to split the Western Powers. We had dealt with the problem at Geneva and could do so again. The alternatives which the United States had mentioned were for discussion only.

The Secretary said that we had studied the legal aspects of the Berlin situation very carefully and had found that the access rights of the Allied garrisons were clear but that the legal basis of civilian access was muddy because the 1949 agreements (i.e., the New York Agreement of May 4 and the Paris Four-Power communique of June 20) had merely confirmed a situation which had not been clear before. We had always been concerned about this and feared that the Soviets might concentrate on the attrition of civilian communications rather than Allied access.

Foreign Minister von Brentano concurred that the situation would be dangerous if the Soviets should accept Allied rights of access but contest the right of civilian traffic. He agreed that the 1949 agreements were not entirely clear but added that the Paris communique called for the improvement of civilian access and that this provision had never been implemented. The Soviets might now say that they want some sort of treaty settlement of the civilian access question. There is no telling where negotiations on this subject would end. In any case, an attempt would be made to intrude the "GDR" into the negotiations, and an agreement to which the GDR was a party would involve the de facto recognition of the GDR. While there is a legal distinction between de facto and de jure recognition, there is small difference from a political point of view and even de facto recognition would bring a severe psychological reaction in Germany.

The Foreign Minister considered that it would be a false starting point for discussions if the Western Powers allowed German civilian access rights to be put in question. These rights were confirmed by pre-1949 precedents. The Western Powers can only start by taking the position that the 1949 agreements confirmed German access rights. They can negotiate about the enforcement or implementation of these rights, but there is no basis for negotiation about the rights themselves.

Secretary Herter agreed it would be wrong to create any doubts about the situation. The matter had never come up directly at Geneva. There the Western Powers had spoken of access rights in general, without distinguishing Allied from civilian. However, he felt the question should be explored to determine what rights would exist vis-a-vis Pankow after the conclusion of a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR.

Foreign Minister von Brentano admitted that such a treaty would complicate the situation despite the fact that the treaty, which the Soviets would in effect be concluding with themselves, could not affect any existing rights. However, the moment one acknowledges any doubt about civilian access, the negotiating partner

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partner becomes the GDR rather than the Soviet Union. The purpose of the peace treaty would be to make the GDR a negotiating partner with the Western Powers. The Soviets might agree that Allied rights do not depend on Pankow, but maintain that this is true only of Allied rights. We must consider whether we are ready to discuss the question on this basis. Before making their July 28, 1959 proposal to the Soviets, the Western Powers all agreed that the primal (original) rights of the Allies could not be affected by an interim Berlin agreement. They agreed that no distinction should be made between Allied and civilian access rights. They also agreed that Allied rights would be reserved and remain valid after the expiration of an interim agreement.

The Foreign Minister then recapitulated his remarks (for the information of Chancellor Adenauer, who joined the meeting at this point) as follows: Allied primal rights should not be allowed to come into question; otherwise the Western Powers must deal with the GDR. It was agreed at Geneva that the legal situation was unambiguous, although the civil access situation was never clear. There were provisions in the Paris communique regarding improvement of civilian access, but these were never carried out. There is a great danger in considering the legal basis of the Western position in Berlin to be doubtful; this legal basis cannot be a subject for negotiation.

Chancellor Adenauer referred to the dangers of a temporary agreement, saying that the principle *rebus sic stantibus* would operate against the West. To conclude a contractual arrangement for one, two, or three years would mean constant blackmail thereafter. A contractual arrangement would bring insecurity and uncertainty; there would be a bad effect on the Berlin population, and large numbers would leave the city.

The Chancellor said that the Paris communique of 1949 expressly mentioned the civilian population and confirmed pre-blockade civilian traffic even if this traffic was never clearly defined. Traffic is a factual concept; the technical term "traffic" was used but legal rights were created. The Western Powers had protected civilian access via the Autobahn before 1949. Furthermore, the Western Powers had themselves taken, in notes to the Soviets, the position that civilian traffic was covered by access rights. The communique which was issued after the White House meeting that morning mentioned the need of the consent of the Berlin population for any agreement reached on Berlin. This consent would not be forthcoming if civilian access rights were not upheld in the agreement. In taking such a position, the Western Powers would lose Berlin's trust and get nothing in exchange from the Soviets. De Gaulle had told the Chancellor that he would never accept this; therefore Western unity would also be jeopardized.

Secretary Herter agreed, but pointed out that the Federal Republic and West Berlin had already adapted themselves to various East German measures before the Geneva conference. The West Germans had subsidized the payment of highway and waterways tolls and had dealt similarly with other harassments. If the Soviets quit their functions with respect to Berlin, there would be more tariffs, fees, etc., designed to undermine Berlin's economic life. Between whom would discussions of such matters take place?

Chancellor

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Chancellor Adenauer replied that there was no connection between the tolls and subsidies for Berlin. Berlin always needs support from the West and it depends on its transport for the import of supplies and the export of goods. The Cabinet had considered the tolls question carefully and decided that the payment of the increases was only fair reimbursement for the cost of maintaining roads and waterways.

The Chancellor digressed to say that he had only recently heard how the Berlin situation had originally come about. At the time of the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had had three civilian advisers who worked on the question of Berlin. However, the three Heads of Government had a heavy program, and their time was entirely taken up by generals discussing more urgent military problems. At the end of the Conference, the Heads of Government had merely asked the three civilian advisers whether they had agreed with one another. The latter said they had agreed, and that was it. The legal position of Berlin was only roughly outlined. The problem was one of reasonable interpretation of the sketchy agreement. Things went well until the blockade. General Clay had then been ready to restore surface access by force, but an airlift was finally decided upon. If traffic to Berlin was not admissible under the agreement, the same would be true of the airlift. However, the airlift was in harmony with Allied rights, as the Soviets later admitted. Therefore the legal position of Berlin is clear, although the terms of the Yalta agreement with respect to Berlin are not.

Secretary Herter said that Berlin was being discussed because the Berlin issue was likely to arise at the Summit in the form of Soviet insistence on the necessity of a separate peace treaty with the GDR. If the issue does arise, the discussion will be picked up from the beginning, not the end, of the Geneva meeting. The Secretary added that he was sorry if there was any misunderstanding about our position on Berlin. When the Working Group had started work, we had jotted down a series of alternative proposals. Perhaps we had thus given a false impression that our position was changing. Our study of alternatives does not commit us to anything; one of the advantages of such studies is that they often reveal the unsoundness of some proposals. We mean to reject any idea which is not good. We wished to correct any false impression that the discussion in the Working Group denotes a weakening of our position. The Secretary hoped that any atmosphere of uncertainty could be dispelled in the various Western meetings before the Summit.

Chancellor Adenauer said that he personally had never believed that the United States was taking a weaker position. However, he had been surprised that this thought had been expressed to him by many of the Americans he had just met in New York. These comments might, of course, be election year rumors.

Secretary Herter replied that the best symbol of our position was our Berlin contingency planning. We had carried this planning to the point of envisaging preparations for war over Berlin. The Secretary added that he did not know whom the Chancellor had seen in New York, but that he was glad that the Chancellor had come to Washington to learn the facts.

Chancellor Adenauer then pointed out that half of the time for preparation for the Summit, which began with the Western Summit last December, had already elapsed.

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elapsed. He raised the question whether the Western Powers would be able to work out a completely agreed position by mid-May. He asked whether the Secretary, as coordinator of Summit preparations, would try to expedite these preparations.

Secretary Herter said that he agreed completely that preparations should be speeded up. Referring to the agreement of the President and the Chancellor that morning that disarmament was the most important item, he said that he hoped we would have a better idea in the next three weeks what line the Soviets will take and what the possibilities of serious negotiation are.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S:
3/25/60

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 17, 1960

SUBJECT: Chancellor Adenauer's Proposal for a Plebiscite in West Berlin;
German Participation in Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Frans Krapf, Minister, German Embassy
Dr. Heins Weber, Interpreter

~~SECRET~~ Secretary Harter
Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand - GER

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The Secretary began by reading to Foreign Minister von Brentano a proposed statement expressing his regrets over the unfortunate incident which had occurred earlier today at the National Gallery of Art (the press had reported that someone had drawn several swastikas over the Chancellor's signature in the Gallery's guest book). Von Brentano expressed his thanks and commented that it was stupid to say, as the UPI report had done, that only members of the Chancellor's own party or a press photographer had had the opportunity to draw in the swastikas.

Von Brentano said that he had had a further discussion with Chancellor Adenauer and Ambassador Grewe before their departure for the West Coast, and he had a number of points to make in extension of the conversation with the Chancellor at the Secretary's home yesterday evening. With reference to the proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin first made yesterday by the Chancellor in his speech at the National Press Club, the Germans were now thinking not in terms of a formal highly-organized plebiscite but rather in terms of an action to be prepared by the political parties in West Berlin. A more formal type of plebiscite involving an elaborate machinery and with implied juridical as well as political connotations could scarcely be arranged in time to precede the Summit meeting. Moreover, it might be considered as prejudging a subsequent plebiscite in East Germany. A cable had been sent to Bonn for repetition to Berlin requesting reactions from the local authorities and Foreign Office representatives in the city. Von Brentano said that he was certain his people

in Berlin

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in Berlin would get in touch with the American authorities there to exchange views.

The Secretary said that when he first heard of the proposal the reports had appeared a little confused. It had seemed that the Germans intended to ask the occupying powers to conduct the plebiscite. Now, as he understood it, the Germans were thinking in terms of something to be arranged by the people of Berlin themselves. If it were carried out, he could only hope that the outcome would be as pronounced as in the 1958 elections. Von Brentano commented that, if his people in Berlin had any doubts about the outcome, they would obviously not want to have the action initiated. There was no question but that 96% of the population would still favor the present regime, but perhaps their total participation might be less than in 1958. These factors would have to be considered in arriving at a decision.

Another question which he had discussed with the Chancellor, von Brentano continued, was the desirability of bringing the Federal Republic more intimately into Allied contingency planning. The German Government would like to bring its Defense Ministry into the picture where its cooperation was desirable, and the Chancellor had asked that instructions be issued to this effect.

Mr. Kohler commented that we have tried to bring the Germans more closely into contingency planning. As an example of legitimate German interest in the subject he pointed to the discussions over alert measures in the Federal Republic. Legislation on this subject has not yet been enacted. Action of this type is relevant in proving the seriousness of Western intentions. Von Brentano said he fully agreed. It was unfortunate that the two-thirds majority required in the Bundestag to amend the basic law was not in sight. The SPD was taking a very rigid position. This made it very difficult for the Federal Republic which, he believed, was alone among the NATO countries in lacking emergency powers legislation. After his return to Bonn he intended to make another effort, and would conduct personal discussions with the opposition. In the past the Foreign Office had exercised restraint in this matter and left it largely to the Ministry of the Interior. If the Foreign Office had intervened actively, it would perhaps have looked as if the Government feared that war was imminent.

Returning to the plebiscite proposal, the Secretary said that a difficult aspect would be the formulation of the specific question to be put forward in such an informal plebiscite. He was sorry that the Chancellor on the previous evening had seemed annoyed when the thought was expressed that the procedures used in such a plebiscite might set the pattern for a plebiscite in East Germany. He still believed that the answer to Soviet emphasis on a separate peace treaty should be a proposal for a plebiscite in East Germany.

(Other subjects discussed covered in separate memorandum of conversation.)

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3/25/60

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: March 17, 1960

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SUBJECT: Norstad Plan

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Franz Krapf, Minister, German Embassy
Dr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter

Secretary Herter

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Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand - GER

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During a conversation also dealing with other subjects covered in a separate memorandum, von Brentano raised the question of an inspection zone or zones which the President had discussed with the Chancellor at lunch on Tuesday. Von Brentano said that he had been briefed on the 1957 disarmament discussions, and as he understood it there were four proposals under consideration relating to inspection zones: (a) the US had said it would be prepared, if the Soviet Union were willing to permit inspection in its own territory, to permit similar inspection in the US and Canada; (b) if this were not acceptable to the Soviets, then the US was prepared to set aside certain less extensive areas of the US, Alaska and the Soviet Union, for the same purpose; (c) a similar zone of inspection might be set aside in Europe stretching to the Urals and including all of Western Europe; (d) possibly a more limited zone of inspection in Western Europe could be discussed. A specific proposal on this was never actually made at the conference, but it had been thought that this might include an area within the longitude parallels 5° - 35°.

As to the last of the foregoing proposals, von Brentano continued, he was not competent to discuss the technical or military aspects, that is, whether the development of new weapons demanded a revised concept of the appropriate area to be involved. This was a matter for the experts. But other developments since 1957 had been such as to make some other delimitation of area desirable; at least the question should be raised. The doubts of the Federal Government did not proceed from false considerations of prestige, but it had

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to be said that his Government found the 50 - 350 proposal very bad and distasteful. If you cut out a part of Free Europe, principally Germany, then he feared that a psychological development would begin which would nourish the neutralization of Germany. The public would think that an inspection zone proposal was the first step towards this objective. He did not believe it to be compatible with the NATO concept of equality, and it would lead to the disintegration of that organization. If one asked how this could be claimed relative to the introduction of technical measures alone, he could only reply that, if there were some NATO countries with such inspection measures and others without them, this would introduce an unhealthy element of discrimination. It would obviously have an effect on US troop deployment, or at least on the willingness of the US to keep the necessary equipment for its troops within the area. Therefore the Federal Government would strenuously object to such proposals and request that they not be tabled in the disarmament negotiations.

The Secretary said that it was not the intention to table such a proposal in the disarmament negotiations. We wanted to talk with the German authorities first. The President thought that such a proposal might be a test of Soviet good faith as to whether they were really willing to accept inspection. The question of specific areas to be involved could be discussed. The President was thinking of having this subject raised in the Four-Power Working Group and not in the disarmament group. We know, the Secretary continued, that the Federal Republic has always opposed carving out a special area to include the Federal Republic because of fear that it might lead to neutralization. The President was thinking that the Soviets probably would not accept such a proposal but it would be a good gesture, a sort of combination of the open sky proposals of 1955 supplemented by certain aspects of the 1957 proposals.

After noting that the 1957 proposals also envisaged certain measures of ground inspection, von Brentano observed that such a proposal would set up a dangerous reaction if the area in question turned out to be nearly identical with the Federal Republic. The Soviets would reenter as inspectors. The West should do nothing to encourage neutralization sentiments in the Federal Republic. Any measure which discriminates against any member of the Alliance must also be avoided. These considerations were basic to the reaction of the Chancellor yesterday evening. If the Four-Power Working Group wants to consider such a proposal and discuss the pros and cons, this, of course, could be done, but he wanted the Secretary to know the reasons why the Federal Government would not accept such a proposal and would insist on extending the area involved. To speak very frankly, von Brentano added, we all know that thoughts of this kind and some going even farther are entertained in certain British circles. Such thoughts would find further nourishment in this proposal. He was not speaking of his good friend Selwyn Lloyd, but of certain other British leaders. The Federal Government considered it as highly dangerous to seek to ease tensions through such measures which would lead not to relaxation but rather to heightened tension.

The Secretary

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The Secretary commented that relief of tension was not the most important aspect. Our objectives related to surprise attack and the defense of Europe. We had no fixed ideas as to the area to be involved and certainly no discrimination against the Federal Republic was intended. We would like to find out how, from the viewpoint of military judgment, such a proposal would benefit the West. The best man to provide such a judgment would be General Norstad. Von Brentano agreed that it would be a good thing to get his views, since no one else's views could be more pertinent. The Secretary repeated that we would like to get from General Norstad a military appraisal of the value of such a zone. Von Brentano said that, if such an appraisal were obtained, the military authorities of the Federal Republic would have a basis on which to provide their own comments. The Secretary noted that Norstad would presumably consult fully with them.

Von Brentano observed that the danger is that should the fact of such discussions become public the result would inevitably be dangerous speculation. Unfortunately, it is difficult to avoid leaks in democracies. In his own experience if he had a very secret paper and left it lying open unmarked on his desk no one would be interested. However, if a paper were marked SECRET it was bound to leak out. It would be very bad, he reiterated, if it leaked out that such a proposal were being discussed. The Secretary commented that we have a saying that if you want something to leak you should mark it SECRET.

This was a matter, he continued, which the President wanted to have discussed, and we ought to move ahead with it quickly. We could see value in such a proposal not in the disarmament conference but possibly at the Summit. It might in this context provide an acid test as to whether the Soviets mean what they are saying.

Mr. Kohler raised the question in connection with procedure whether it would not be better, before discussion in the Four-Power Group, to ask Norstad for his views. This would put us in a better position to consider the matter quadripartitely. Von Brentano agreed. Mr. Merchant commented that certainly Norstad would not recommend anything which would have the effect of weakening NATO. Von Brentano said he would ask General Heusinger for his views. Mr. Kohler suggested that we raise the matter privately with the British and French and, if they likewise agreed, then Norstad could be asked for his views. Von Brentano said that there was no need for formal discussions. When Norstad was asked we could at the same time suggest that he obtain the views of his closest collaborators, i.e., the French, British and Germans. Mr. Kohler noted that this would, of course, all be without any commitment on anyone's part.

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WASHINGTON

April 4, 1960

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Director
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: John A. Calhoun *[Signature]*
Director
Executive Secretariat

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Hood read Kohler today summary analytical reporting telegram from ☐ 25X1☐ repeated to Washington regarding position de Gaulle Government. Following were points made by British Embassy Paris:

- 1) Is deGaulle stronger as result of January events in Algiers? British Embassy concludes answer is stronger in short-term, probably weaker in long-term.
- 2) Is rightwing in France and Algeria likely to organize another and more effective revolt? British conclude answer is "very likely".
- 3) In event of another uprising, would deGaulle emerge victorious? Conclusion is "possibly but not (repeat not) necessarily".
- 4) British comment additionally to effect that, in their view, General nearly overthrown in January and only his personal prestige saved situation. Rightist rebels will have learned lessons and will organize better in future especially now that they have Soustelle as available leader.
- 5) Key to situation is whether Army deems it necessary in defense their views on Algeria to replace General. Basic conflict is between deGaulle with popular support in Metropole on one hand versus Army and colons on other. Hope is that General "can bring Army to its senses" and also achieve measure

authority

Drafted by:

EUR:WE:RFMcBride:ld

3/8/60

Telegraphic transmission and

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS/RPT INFO: Amembassy LONDON AmConGen ALGIERS

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authority over Moslems.

6) Immediate prospects for Algerian solution are bad. If FLN becomes equated with "Algerians" Army will be implacable and coup d'etat will occur. Initially this would lead to victory of right under Pinay (sic) and Soustelle, but subsequently it might lead to Popular Front victory in France.

7) However report concludes that deGaulle probably has about 50-50 chance of making his views prevail and of uniting country behind his Algerian policy. (British report drafted prior deGaulle's latest Algerian trip).

Department commented that we agree deGaulle strengthened in short-term but we inclined be somewhat less pessimistic than British re long-term ^{Prospects for long-term} ~~prospects~~ somewhat unclear inasmuch as there many positive elements strength in deGaulle position, particularly on international scene, which counterbalance problems arising over Algerian ~~policy~~ ^{situation.} /C Comment addressee posts invited. (Without discussing with foreign sources).

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